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Introduction and Executive Summary
The Executive Committee convened the Task Force on
Environmental Aspects of the NY State Constitution in January
of 2017 with the following purpose:
study and prepare a written report, to submit to
the Section’s Executive Committee, regarding (1)
environmental
issues
appropriate
for
consideration in any amendment to the New York
Constitution, beyond the issues which the NYSBA
House of Delegate has already determined, and
(2) constitutional issues relevant to climate
change, and (3) appropriate provisions for an
environmental right in the State Constitution,
and (4) any other environmental issues that the
Task Force considers important for submission to
the Section Executive CommitteeFalse1
The Task Force has met, consulted, and prepared the Report
and Recommendations that follow. As described in greater
detail and for the reasons provided, the Task Force recommends:
(I)
(II)

That no changes be made to Article XIV; and
Article I be amended to set forth an environmental
right.

The purpose of the Report is to inform and enrich
understanding of environmental issues which may be considered
at a Constitutional Convention (should one occur) or with
respect to proposals to amend the Constitution through the
legislative process.
The New York State Bar Association supports a
Constitutional Convention. If a convention is held, the Task
* The opinions expressed are those of the committee preparing this report and
do not represent those of the New York State Bar Association unless and until
they have been adopted by its House of Delegates or Executive Committee.
1. Memorandum from Nicholas A. Robinson to Lawrence P. Schnapf,
Proposals for a Section Task Force on Environmental Aspects of the NY State
Constitution (Jan. 27, 2017).
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Force recommends as follows:
Recommendation I
No changes to Article XIV are needed or advisable.
Some analyses of Article XIV2 have suggested tweaks
designed to update and simplify the Article’s text without
altering its substantive content and protections. The Task Force
examined two such suggestions for how the text of Article XIV
could be improved (deletion of the “as now fixed by law” clause
and repeal of Section 2, the Burd Amendment) and concluded in
each case that no change is needed or advisable. The Task Force
is also aware of proposals to amend Article XIV that might be
raised at a Constitutional Convention and could have the effect
of weakening the text. The Task Force does not believe that
textual amendment is necessary to improve Article XIV and
further recognizes that a Constitutional Convention creates the
risk that Article XIV could be weakened.
(1) Evaluating the “as now fixed by law” clause
Article XIV provides in Section 1, “The lands of the state,
now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest
preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest
lands.”3 The “as now fixed by law” clause is the key to preventing
the Legislature from purporting to (re)define the Forest
Preserve. The clause anchors the definition in time, in a way
serving the “forever” part of the constitutional mandate.
The Constitutional Convention debates of September 7 and
8, 1894 make clear the purpose behind the phrase “as now fixed
by law.” The delegates knew they were “fixing” the definition of
Forest Preserve in a statute not part of the Constitution and that
the use of the phrase was intended to prevent the Legislature

2. Including the New York State Bar Association, Report and
Recommendations Concerning the Conservation Article in the State
Constitution (Article XIV) (approved by the House of Delegates November 5,
2016).
3. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §1 (emphasis added).
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from changing the definition by changing the statute. On
September 7, delegate David McClure, Chairman of the Special
Committee on State Forest Preservation which had proposed the
Forever Wild Clause explained that he inserted the words “as
now fixed by law” in the original draft, saying he was doing so to
prevent the Legislature from ever changing the statutory
definition of the phrase in Laws of 1893, chapter 332:
The object of inserting “as now fixed by law” is to
prevent the Legislature from at any time limiting
the extent of the forest preserves by providing
that in a certain county which by the laws of the
state is now a part of the forest preserves there
should not be included within it, or in any way
excepting, any part of the lands within that
county. It was thought by the committee desirable
to fix it so that as the law now constitutes the
forest preserves it shall be understood to be
referred to in the Constitution.4
The “as now fixed by law” clause thus serves an important
function and should be retained.
(2) Evaluating Section 2, the Burd Amendment
Section 2, the Burd Amendment, reserves up to three
percent of the Forest Preserve “for the construction and
maintenance of reservoirs for municipal water supply, and for
the canals of the state.”5 The Burd Amendment is specifically
limited to the construction and maintenance of reservoirs for
municipal water supplies and for the supplying water to the
canals of the State. It does not authorize the use of Forest
Preserve for water wells, nor does it authorize the flooding of
Forest Preserve for flood control reservoirs or to address river
level fluctuations. It is very unlikely a municipality will propose

4. See, Robert C. Glennon, “Non-Forest Preserve: Inconsistent Use,” in
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE ADIRONDACK PARK IN THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY, TECHNICAL REPORT, Vol 1, No. 5, at 76 n. 5.
5. N.Y. CONST., art. XIV, sec. 2.
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a new water supply reservoir in the Forest Preserve because
today’s New York State Health Department is very opposed to
surface water reservoirs in the Forest Preserve as a source of
drinking water and would be unlikely to issue a permit for same.
It is even more unlikely that anyone would ever propose a new
dam and reservoir for any canal system. Section 2 thus
expressly limits any prospective dam and water impoundment
project and does so in a manner that renders it extremely
unlikely that such a project would be pursued. For those
reasons, the Task Force concludes that Section 2 should not be
amended or deleted.
The Task Force also recognizes the value of the Section 4
State Nature and Historical Preserve Trust which has been used
by land conservationists to protect tens of thousands of acres of
scenic and ecologically “unique” lands as part of the State
Nature and Historical Preserve Trust created by Section 4.6
Section 4 provides for State acquisition of lands for a “state
nature and historical preserve” located outside of the Forest
Preserve.7 The statutory authority for Article 45 of the
Environmental Conservation Law is expressly predicated on
Section 4 of Article XIV8 and Environmental Conservation Law
§§ 45-0117 and 51-0703 give effect to this provision by creating
a State Nature and Historical Preserve Trust to protect unique
natural resources and features of State forests and wildlife
management areas designated as “unique areas” to be included
in the Trust.
Therefore, the Task Force concludes that there is no need to
update or amend the text of Article XIV. The Task Force is
further concerned that the following contemporary Adirondack
legal controversies might be addressed by the delegates of a

6. The Task Forth further notes that Section 3 of Article XIV creates the
legal basis for some 750,000 acres of state forest land and 250,000 acres of state
wildlife management areas outside the bluelines of the Adirondack and
Catskill Forest Preserve. While Section 3 notes that the strict limits of section
1 of Article XIV do not apply to these lands, section 3 concludes with this strong
legal protection for these valuable lands, declaring “that such lands shall not
be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public or private.”
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Section 3 preserves these valuable lands all across
the state from commercial exploitation or sale.
7. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
8. See ECL § 45-0101.
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Constitutional Convention to the detriment of the “forever wild”
character of the Forest Preserve:
- A possible amendment approving an Adirondack Park
network of road-like community connector snowmobile
trails should the State lose the currently pending Protect
the Adirondacks v. DEC case challenging the creation of
such a snowmobile trail system;
- An amendment to allow all-terrain vehicle use of the great
network of existing and future snowmobile trails if
climate change threatens the practicality of snowmobile
use and its contribution to the economy of communities
in the Adirondack Park;
- a Closed Cabin Amendment redux, arising from current
DEC proposals like the 5-acre “Unclassified” parcel to
facilitate a dining and lodging hut-to-hut/yurt facility on
the Forest Preserve lands of the Boreas Tract or other
Forest Preserve lands on the 15 identified “hut to hut”
trail routes in the Adirondack Park.
Article XIV presently provides robust protection to the
Forest Preserve. Even small, well-intentioned changes to the
text of Article XIV run the risk of occasioning unintended
consequences and open the door to efforts to weaken Article XIV.
The Task Force thus recommends that Article XIV should not be
amended, changed or modified.
Recommendation II
Article I should articulate and provide for the protection
of a right to clean and healthy environment.
The Task Force supports the adoption of a constitutional
right to a clean and healthful environment. We propose that the
right be embodied as a new Section 19 of Article I, which
contains other bill of rights provisions such as free speech and
equal protection.9 The beneficial operation of similar provisions
9. The Task Force recommends incorporation of an environmental right
in Article I, as opposed to Article XIV, because such a right is appropriately
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in other jurisdictions, the anticipated emergence of climate
change-related environmental challenges unprecedented in
their severity and complexity, and the limited scope of New
York’s existing Conservation Bill of Rights augur in favor of the
adoption of such a right.
Several states and nations have already adopted
constitutional environmental rights10 and efforts are underway
to secure the recognition of environmental rights around the
world.11 In March 2017, the New York State Assembly passed
Assembly Bill 6279 which would amend Article I of the
Constitution by adding: “Each person shall have a right to clean
air and water, and a healthful environment.”12 Most notably in
the United States, three states—Pennsylvania, Montana and
Hawaii—have enacted constitutional provisions to protect
environmental values, which the courts of those states have
ruled to be enforceable by citizens. In these jurisdictions,
constitutional environmental rights provisions have proven to be
viewed as on par with the other important rights protected in Article I.
Additionally, any effort to amend Section 4 of Article XIV to include an
environmental right might invite opponents to attempt to delete or weaken
Section 5 of Article XIV, its vitally important citizens suit provision. Section 5
is critical, especially to give citizens and advocacy groups the right to sue to
protect the “forever wild” character of the Forest Preserve. Existing Article
XIV effectively protects the Forest Preserve in the Adirondack and Catskill
State Parks. That provision, part of the State Constitution since 1894, is vital
to the future of those areas of our State so important environmentally and for
tourism and recreation. It should be maintained in its integrity.
10. See Environment and Natural Resource Provisions in State
Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 73 (2002) (surveying state
constitutional provisions); James R. May & Erin Daley, Constitutional
Environmental Rights Worldwide, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 329 (2011).
11. Delaware Riverkeeper, for example, has a new initiative, For the
Generations, “to pursue and secure constitutional protection of environmental
rights in states across the nations.”
Delaware Riverkeeper, For the
Generations, available at http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/ongoingissues/generations (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). Additionally, the draft Global
Pact for the Environment provides in Article I, “Every person has the right to
live in an ecologically sound environment adequate for their health, well-being,
dignity, culture and fulfilment.” Preliminary Draft Global Pact for the
Environment
(June
24,
2017),
available
at
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/draft-project-of-theglobal-pact-for-the-environment.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
12. While we also recommend adoption of a constitutional environmental
right in Article 1, the text that we propose differs in some respects for the
reasons described infra.
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environmentally protective, a useful means to require
consideration of the interests of future generations, and have not
unduly displaced legislative prerogative.
Additionally, emerging environmental threats present
unprecedented societal challenges.
Vexing environmental
problems have emerged within the scope of traditional
regulation of air and water quality, such as increased
recognition of connections between pollution and asthma rates,
awareness of local air pollution hot spots, and the detection of
widespread contamination of drinking water with a range of
pollutants (such as pharmaceuticals, PFOAs and 1,4 dioxane).
More importantly, however, climate change presents challenges
that have no historical analog in their scope and complexity and
will require a long-term, proactive, and thoughtful
governmental response.13
Finally, as presently interpreted, the existing Conservation
Bill of Rights in Article XIV Section 4 does not function as a
robust assertion of environmental right that can help New York
meet these unprecedented challenges.
The existing
Conservation Bill of Rights in Article XIV, section 4, provides in
relevant part:
The policy of the state shall be to conserve and
protect its natural resources and scenic beauty
and encourage the development and improvement
of its agricultural lands for the production of food
and other agricultural products. The legislature,
in implementing this policy, shall include
adequate provision for the abatement of air and
water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary
noise, the protection of agricultural lands,
wetlands and shorelines, and the development
and regulation of water resources.

13. For a discussion of how the public trust doctrine can guide adaptation
to climate change in the context of water resources, see Robin Kundis Craig,
Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public
Trust Doctrines, 34 VERMONT L. REV. 781 (2009) (describing how state public
trust doctrines can support adaptive management for water resources in the
context of climate change).
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The Conservation Bill of Rights was held in Leland v. Moran
to afford no “constitutionally protected property right”
enforceable in the courts and its substantive charge is both
limited in scope and generally understood to be fulfilled by
existing environmental statutes.14
The analysis that follows (1) undertakes a close examination
of the most serious concern expressed about the adoption of a
self-executing constitutional environmental right, namely that
it will displace legislative and executive authority with in
environmental policymaking; and (2) evaluates different
constructions and orientations of a constitutional environmental
right. This analysis concludes that it is unlikely that adoption
of a self-executing environmental right in New York would
override basic principles of judicial deference to legislative and
executive actions. It also recommends that the right be oriented
around the concept of a governmental trust duty enforceable
directly by citizens in actions against the government and that
it expressly reference the interests of future generations and
incorporate ecological principles.
(1) Assessing the implications of a self-executing right
The potential to shift policymaking authority from the
legislature to the judiciary is often identified as a chief reason
not to constitutionalize environmental rights or duties. For a
variety of reasons, legislatures may be more institutionally
suited to develop environmental policy.15 Judicial intervention
may, however, be warranted when the legislative process proves
inadequate to protect core environmental values,16 which is
14. Leland v. Moran, 235 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 80
Fed. Appx. 133, 2003 WL 22533185 (2d Cir. 2003).
15. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and
State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 863, 891-899 (1996) (explaining various reasons why legislatures are a
preferred venue for developing environmental policy, including that judicial
intervention can reduce incentives for legislative action, legislatures are in a
better position to decide environmental tradeoffs which present largely
political questions, legislatures are better equipped to engage in fact-finding).
16. See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government
Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State
Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1515-16 (2010) (describing the argument
that even the expression of general constitutional principles should warrant
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particularly likely to occur when, for example, seeking to protect
the interests of future generations17; additionally, a shift of
authority to the judiciary is arguably less troubling from the
perspective of democratic representation at the state, as
compared to the federal level.18 And many lament that it is
difficult for public environmental rights and concerns to be
redressed in New York’s courts because New York State
environmental statutes lack the citizen-suit provisions found in
the major federal environmental statutes.19 We note the
existence of long-running debate about the optimal role for the
judiciary in environmental policy and that it undergirds concern
about constitutionalizing environmental rights.
To inform assessment of the advisability of incorporating a
more robust (self-executing) environmental right in the New
York State Constitution, it is thus useful to consider whether
and to what extent adopting such a right would, in fact or
potential, shift environmental policymaking to the judiciary.
The analysis that follows assesses the impact that robust, selfexecuting constitutional environmental rights have had on the
distribution of judicial and legislative authority in those states
where such a right or duty is recognized and seeks to envision
how such a right might affect judicial authority in New York.
Ultimately, while a robust, self-executing constitutional
environmental right would allow for increased judicial
participation in significant environmental disputes, it is
unlikely that such participation would unduly encroach on the
core role of the legislature. States that recognize a robust, selfjudicial enforcement in certain circumstances).
17. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The
History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV.
157, 198 (2003) (positing that the “normative argument for constitutional
intervention is stronger” with respect to “[e]nvironmental issues that involve
future generations, such as the depletion of exhaustible resources, the
endangerment of species, global climate change, and the use of long-lived
toxics.”).
18. State court judges are, for example, more accountable to the
electorate and closer to state culture and legal norms and state constitutions
can be more easily amended (thereby providing a more feasible means for the
citizenry to override judicial constitutional interpretations with which it
disagrees). Usman, supra note 16, at 1524.
19. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976)
(interpreting federal citizen suit provisions to allow citizens to be “welcomed
participants in the vindication of environmental interests.”).
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executing constitutional environmental right have not
experienced a radical or undesirable shift of environmental
policymaking authority to the judiciary. In Montana, judicial
intervention has been relatively limited and reserved for cases
presenting unusual and compelling facts. In Hawai’i, judicial
intervention to enforce constitutional environmental rights has
been more common and involved, but is perhaps best
characterized as requiring dialogue about and attentiveness to
environmental values. And in Pennsylvania, while the judiciary
has twice invoked constitutional environmental rights to strike
down State statutes, both cases involve disputes about the
appropriate development of the State’s natural gas reserves
through fracking, a factual situation that closely parallels the
concerns about environmental damage associated with
historical exploitation of Pennsylvania’s natural resources that
motivated the adoption of its Environmental Rights
Amendment.
Additionally, in terms of predicting how New York courts
might interpret and apply a similar right, it is useful to note that
when New York courts have interpreted self-executing positive
constitutional rights addressed to other subjects (such as
poverty), they have done so in a manner that largely preserves
legislative prerogative. Finally, the text of the environmental
right that we recommend for New York is oriented and phrased
so as to provide the citizens of New York with a judicial
backstop—a means to challenge actions affecting integral
environmental values while largely preserving existing
mechanisms of environmental policymaking and protection.
Positive constitutional environmental rights and
judicial authority
Environmental

constitutional

rights20

are

typically

20. Environmental rights can be expressed in a variety of ways in state
constitutions and typically involve the assertion of an affirmative, individual
right to a clean and healthy environment (or similar). Many state constitutions
also impose trust duties. Most notably, the Hawai’i and Pennsylvania
constitutions house both affirmative grants of environmental rights provisions
and declare public trust duties and in both states it is the public trust duties
that have proved particularly important in key decisions.
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articulated as positive (second-generation or substantive)
rights.21 The enforcement of positive rights can require courts
not only to prevent or stop government action (as would be
demanded in the enforcement of negative rights), but further to
compel legislative action and thus “immerse[ ] courts more
deeply within the affairs of the executive and legislative
branches” and raise separation of powers concerns.22 A review
of state judicial interpretation of positive state constitutional
rights reveals that courts often deploy doctrines or approaches
(political question, finding that an affirmative right is not selfexecuting, recognizing that the right imposes an affirmative
duty on the legislature but giving the legislature broad
discretion in defining the scope of the duty, narrowly
interpreting the scope of environmental rights provisions,
declining to hear cases on procedural grounds (such as standing
or ripeness)) that largely preserve the traditional distribution of
authority between the judiciary and the legislature and avoid
judicial policymaking.23 These approaches can be seen in New
York, where at least one court has held that Section 4, the
existing Conservation Bill of Rights, affords no constitutionallyprotected property right enforceable by courts (effectively
treating it as non-self-executing)24; and, in the context of
interpreting Article XVIII, Section 1 (imposing an affirmative
obligation to help the needy), courts have largely deferred to the

21. For a discussion of the distinction between positive and negative
constitutional rights, see Usman, supra note 16, at 1462-1464.
22. Id. at 1495.
23. Usman, supra note 16, at 1497-1506; Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s
Environmental Provisions, supra note 17, at 163-65 (2003); Thompson,
Environmental Policy, supra note 15, at 896-97.
24. Leland v. Moran, 235 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 80
Fed. Appx. 133, 2003 WL 22533185 (2d Cir. 2003). Of note, it is also relatively
difficult to demonstrate standing in New York in many environmental public
interest cases. Albert K. Butzel; Ned Thimmayya, The Tyranny of Plastics:
How Society of Plastics, Inc. v. County of Suffolk Prevents New Yorkers from
Protecting Their Environment and How They Could Be Liberated from Its
Unreasonable Standing Requirements, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015)
(lamenting the stringency of standing requirements under SEQRA and
documenting that “numerous other states have developed standing doctrines
that more capably match the purposes of their environmental protection acts
and address the ecological complexities of environmental harms yet also
prevent frivolous complaints from disrupting judicial efficiency”).
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legislature regarding the adequacy of benefits.25
In some circumstances, however, courts have applied strict
scrutiny to state constitutional affirmative rights (see discussion
of application of Montana’s environmental right, supra) or
become deeply enmeshed in defining and overseeing the
implementation of policy necessary to satisfy the state
constitutional affirmative right (for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s involvement in school finance litigation).26
Both of these approaches to interpreting affirmative rights in
state constitutions (strict scrutiny and active judicial
management) can result in greater judicial policymaking at the
expense of legislative prerogative.
To better understand the potential for a constitutional
environmental right to give rise to increased policymaking on
the environmental by the judiciary, a short review follows of the
experience in the three states with positive constitutional
environmental rights where those rights have been treated as
self-executing and have not been otherwise unduly limited
through court interpretation, Hawai’i, Montana and
Pennsylvania.27

25. Usman, supra note 16, at 1504-05; Sylvia Ewald, Note, State Court
Adjudication of Environmental Rights: Lessons from the Adjudication of the
Right to Education and the Right to Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 44547 (2011) (“New York courts have taken a relatively conservative approach to
welfare rights, and are highly deferential to the legislature in this area.”).
26. Usman, supra note 16, at 1508-11.
27. Of note, six state constitutions articulate environmental rights,
Sylvia Ewald, Note, State Court Adjudication of Environmental Rights:
Lessons from the Adjudication of the Right to Education and the Right to
Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 420 (2011), although many more address
environmental matters in some fashion (including through the identification
of government trust duties).
Of the state constitutions articulating
environmental rights, two environmental rights provisions are not selfexecuting as they textually require legislative action (Massachusetts, Rhode
Island). Id. at 423. Another state environmental right provision (Illinois) is
explicitly self-executing, but has been interpreted primarily as a means to
demonstrate standing in claims based upon other state laws. Id. at 426-29.
See also People v. Pollution Control Bd., 129 Ill. App. 3d 958, 964, 473 N.E.2d
452, 456 (1984) (holding that the intent of the Illinois constitutional
environmental rights provision was merely “to remove the special injury
requirement for standing” and thus functions only “to ensure standing, not to
create substantive causes of action.”).
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Hawai’i
Article XI, Section 1 of the Hawai’i Constitution provides:
For the benefit of present and future generations,
the State and its political subdivisions shall
conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and
all natural resources, including land, water, air,
minerals and energy sources, and shall promote
the development and utilization of these resources
in a manner consistent with their conservation
and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the
State. All public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people.28
Article XI, Section 9 of the Hawai’i Constitution provides:
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment, as defined by laws relating to
environmental quality, including control of
pollution and conservation, protection and
enhancement of natural resources. Any person
may enforce this right against any party, public or
private, through appropriate legal proceedings,
subject to reasonable limitations and regulation
as provided by law.29
The trust duty set forth in Article XI, Section 1 coexists with
and is defined with reference to common law public trust
principles. While it is difficult to discern precisely what the
constitutional expression of the trust duty adds to underlying
common law public trust doctrine, Hawai’ian courts have been
clear that the constitutional expression strengthens the trust
duty, observing that through the “constitutional affirmation of a
trust duty the people of this state have elevated the public trust
doctrine to the level of a constitutional mandate.”30 Courts
28. HRS Const. Art. XI, § 1.
29. HRS Const. Art. XI, § 9.
30. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 131, 9 P.3d 409,
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invoking Section 1 have further suggested that judicial review is
more searching when public trust duties are involved, noting
that “while agency decisions affecting public trust resources
carry a presumption of validity,” ultimately “[a]s with other
state constitutional guarantees, the ultimate authority to
interpret and defend the public trust in Hawai’i rests with the
courts of this state.”31 In the context of water resources (most
closely aligned with traditional, common law understandings of
the public trust doctrine), Hawai’ian courts have actively
defined32 and policed the scope of public trust duties, making
clear that the public trust doctrine has “independent vitality,” to
“inform the [State Water] Code’s interpretation, define its
permissible ‘outer limits,’ and justify its existence.”33
While the Section 1 public trust duty has been developed
primarily with regard to water resources, it has also been held
to encompass lands in the public domain.34 In Mauna Kea, the
Supreme Court of Hawai’i held that the Board of Land and
Natural Resources had violated, inter alia, Article XI, Section 1
of the Hawai’i Constitution as a matter of law by deciding the
merits of an application for a permit for a proposed astronomy
observatory on Mauna Kea before conducting a contested case
hearing in which the public trust doctrine, and the obligations it
imposes on the State, could have been duly considered.35 The
court held that Mauna Kea was within the public trust and that
“an agency of the State must perform its statutory function in a
manner that fulfills the State’s affirmative constitutional
obligations,”
namely
“fashion
procedures
that
are
commensurate to the constitutional stature of the rights
involved.”36 Notably, however, the court’s decision did not rest
443 (2000).
31. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 143, 9 P.3d 409,
455 (2000).
32. In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc., 103 Haw. 401, 429, 83 P.3d 664, 692
(2004) (exploring the scope of public trust duties relating to water resources).
33. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 133, 9 P.3d 409,
445 (2000).
34. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172 (Haw. 2005)
(suggesting in dicta that the public trust could apply to biodiversity).
35. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 136 Haw. 376,
409, 363 P.3d 224, 257 (2015).
36. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 136 Haw. 376,
414, 363 P.3d 224, 262 (2015).
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solely on the Section 1 trust duty; the court also held that
issuance of the permit before a contested case hearing violated
the due process rights of parties with standing to assert Native
Hawaiian traditional and customary rights.
Hawai’i’s constitution also sets forth the right to a clean and
healthful environment in Article XI, Section 9.
This
constitutional right was long referenced by Hawaiian courts
primarily to support liberalized standing. However, in Ala Loop
Homeowners, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that article XI,
Section 9 is self-executing and provides an implied private right
of action to enforce State laws relating to environmental
quality.37 The court thus held that a neighborhood association
had a private right of action to seek to enforce land use statutes
against a charter school. In its decision, the court noted the
intent of the framers at the 1978 Constitutional Convention to
increase public involvement:
Your Committee believes that this important
right deserves enforcement and has removed the
standing to sue barriers, which often delay or
frustrate resolutions on the merits of actions or
proposals, and provides that individuals may
directly sue public and private violators of
statutes, ordinances and administrative rules
relating to environmental quality. The proposal
adds no new duties but does add potential
enforcers.38
Notably, although Ala Loop Homeowners would seem to
invite suits to enforce state environmental laws, few
environmental decisions have relied on Ala Loop Homeowners in
the intervening seven years. Moreover, the court also signaled
deference to the legislature in defining the scope of the
constitutional environmental right, observing that Article XI,
Section 9 “recognizes a substantive right ‘to a clean and
37. Cty. of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391, 417, 235 P.3d
1103, 1129, 1134 (2010).
38. Cty. of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391, 414, 235 P.3d
1103, 1125-26 (2010) (citing to Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 689–690 (1980)).
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healthful environment,’ with the content of that right to be
established not by judicial decisions but rather ‘as defined by
laws relating to environmental quality.’”39
In Hawai’i, then, the constitutional assertion of a public
trust duty appears to have resulted in significant judicial
oversight, particularly with regard to the development of policy
governing water resources (a subject matter with respect to
which there is often some judicial involvement even absent a
constitutional provision as a result of the “amphibious” scope of
the common law public trust doctrine). Judicial oversight is both
substantive (requiring, for example, that intergenerational
interests be considered) and procedural (compelling procedures
sufficient to assure consideration of public trust values).
Judicial intervention does not, however, approach the level of
judicial management sometimes seen in the context of other
state constitutional positive rights, such as education or
assistance to the needy. The judiciary appears to be adding its
voice to a dialogue with agencies and the legislature about
appropriate considerations and processes in environmental
policy—a level of judicial involvement with which even many
wary of undue judicial aggrandizement are likely comfortable.
The constitutional enshrinement of an environmental right,
while interpreted to be self-executing and to provide a right of
action to enforce environmental laws, has not yet resulted in
notable judicial oversight of environmental policy.
Montana
Montana’s constitution provides in relevant part:
All persons are born free and have certain
inalienable rights. They include the right to a
clean and healthful environment . . . .40
***

39. Cty. of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391, 409, 235 P.3d
1103, 1121 (2010) (citing to Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of Hawai’i of 1978, at 689).
40. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
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(1) The state and each person shall maintain and
improve a clean and healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the
administration and enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate
remedies for the protection of the environmental
life support system from degradation and provide
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable
depletion and degradation of natural resources.41
For many years, the Montana Supreme Court referenced
the constitutional environmental provisions to uphold State
action, but declined to rely on those provisions to “challenge
actions harming the environment.”42 However, in 1999, the
Montana Supreme Court held that an amendment to Montana’s
Water Quality Act which excluded certain activities from review
under the Act’s nondegradation policy, thereby allowing the
discharge of arsenic-containing water without environmental
review, implicated the right to a clean and healthful
environment, and could survive only after the application of
strict scrutiny on remand.43 The Montana Supreme Court found
that the right to a “clean and healthful” environment is a
fundamental right and that “any statute or rule which
implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized and can only
survive strict scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state
interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that
interest and is the least onerous path that can be taken to
achieve the State’s objective.”44 Two years later, the Montana
Supreme Court applied this holding to private actions, relying
on the constitutional provisions to invalidate a private
contractual provision that would have required drilling a well
through a contaminated aquifer, potentially spreading the
contamination.45

167.

41. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1.
42. Thompson, Constitutionalizing the Environment, supra note 17, at
43. MEIC v. DEQ, 296 Mont. 207, 231 (1999).
44. MEID v. DEQ, 296 Mont. 207, 225 (1999).
45. Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, 305 Mont. 513 (2001).
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By invoking strict scrutiny and extending the reach of the
constitutional provisions to private actions, these cases would
appear to have significant potential to increase judicial
policymaking in the environmental realm. The cases, however,
have not prompted a flood of litigation or a radical redistribution
of policymaking to the judiciary. Few discovered cases have
successfully relied on this precedent and, while it is too early to
know how case law will evolve, to date the most enduring
principle to have emerged is that legislative exemptions to
environmental statutes will be subject to close scrutiny. Indeed,
the Montana Supreme Court “has begun to demarcate the limits
of the MEIC holding” in a manner that “suggests that the court
will be deferential to state and local governments” and “will
continue to give deference to the interpretations of
administrative agencies.”46 In 2012, for example, the Montana
Supreme Court limited the scope of its holding that the
environmental right is fundamental, subjecting a statute
deferring environmental review for a coal strip mining operation
until the permitting stage to only rational basis review. The
Court’s reasoning was that
the leases themselves do not allow for any
degradation of the environment, conferring only
the exclusive right to apply for State permits, and
because
they
specifically
require
full
environmental review and full compliance with
applicable State environmental laws, the act of
issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the
right to a clean and healthful environment in
Article II, Section 3 of the Montana
Constitution.47
Nonetheless, in the words of one scholar, “[t]he Montana
46. Ewald, Note, supra note 27, at 432-33. See generally John D.
Echeverria, State Judicial Elections and Environmental Law: Case Studies of
Montana, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 363,
376 (2015) (observing that “in the last several years, environmental advocates
have suffered several important losses in the Supreme Court, suggesting a
shift in attitudes on the Court toward environmental cases.”).
47. N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 2012
MT 234, ¶ 19, 366 Mont. 399, 406, 288 P.3d 169, 174 (2012).
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court’s powerful interpretation of the constitutional right to a
clean and healthful environment . . . affects agency decisions,
thwarts legislative efforts to give polluters and developers
statutory breaks from environmental laws, and infuses public
debate on environmental issues.”48
Pennsylvania
Article I, Section 27 of Pennsylvania’s constitution, the
Environmental Rights Amendment, provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.49
Section 27 is located in Article I, the Pennsylvania’s
Declaration of Rights, which also provides for religious freedom,
freedom of speech, and protection from unreasonable search and
seizure.50 Section 25 declares that rights set forth in Article I
are “excepted out of the general powers of government and shall
forever remain inviolate.”51
Early Pennsylvania cases interpreted Section 27 as a grant
of power to the government (as opposed to a limitation upon it)
and required only that government decisions challenged as
violating Section 27 satisfy a three-part balancing test largely
divorced from the Section’s text (the Payne test).52 Courts also
48. Jack R. Tuholske, U.S. State Constitutions and Environmental
Protection: Diamonds in the Rough, 21 Widener L. Rev. 239, 245 (2015).
49. Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
50. Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8.
51. Pa. Const. art. I, § 25.
52. Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d
588, 594 (Pa. 1973); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973),
aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). See also Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a
Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 473-78 (2015) (summarizing pre-
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came to understand the section to not be self-executing.53 So
construed, Section 27 had little practical effect.
In 2013, in Robinson Township, a plurality of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked Section 27, in particular
its trust provisions, to strike down as unconstitutional a State
statute (Act 13) that amended the 1969 Oil and Gas Act to
impose a regulatory structure for unconventional gas
development, including inter alia, by overriding local
ordinances.54 In deciding that Act 13 violated the Section 27
(primarily its trust clause), the plurality clarified that because
Section 27 appears in Article I it imposes a limit on government
power and that the right is self-executing.55
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this time in a
majority decision, expanded on Robinson Township, striking
down legislation that allowed royalties from oil and gas drilling
to be used for non-environmental (general) purposes with
consideration of trust duties.56 Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Foundation built on Robinsons Township in several
important ways, including by expressly overruling the
deferential Payne test for assessing violations of the
Environmental Rights Amendment and holding that private
trust law principles are to be used to interpret the scope of the
Commonwealth’s trust duty. The majority invoked private trust
law and reasoned that the proceeds from the sale of trust assets
become part of the corpus of the trust and must be managed
consistent with trust purposes; it thus held that the
Commonwealth had violated its fiduciary duties in statutes
directing the use of trust proceeds for general purposes without
consideration of trust purposes.
It is too early to fully appreciate whether and how a
reinvigorated Section 27 might shape Pennsylvania law. One
expert scholar (writing before Pennsyvlania Environmental
Robinson Township Pennsylvania cases interpreting Section 27).
53. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust,
supra note 52, at 475 (describing the evolution of Pennsylvania caselaw
regarding whether Section 27 is self-executing).
54. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
55. Id. at 948, 964-65 & n. 52.
56. 161 A.3d 911 (June 20, 2017).
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Defense Foundation was decided) concluded that most postRobinson Township cases “are more about filling gaps and
repairing inadequacies in the existing environmental regulatory
system than they are about overturning that system and
replacing it with something else. While public constitutional
rights undergird the entire regulatory system, they are likely to
be applied directly in only a relatively small percentage of
cases.”57
While at first blush Pennsylvania Environmental Defense
Foundation may seem like use of a constitutionalized
environmental right for precisely the type of judicial
aggrandizement feared by many, two points bear noting that
should temper this concern. First, both occasions on which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has struck down legislation using
the Environmental Rights Amendment have involved a factual
situation (rapid, economically-motivated exploitation of a
natural resource) that closely mirrors the concerns that
animated adoption of the Environmental Rights Amendment
(such as the environmental harms from timbering and coal
mining).58 Faced with the rapid scale up of fracking to exploit
Pennsylvania’s natural gas resources, the Environmental Rights
Amendment can thus be viewed as functioning as a judicial
backstop, providing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with a
means to strike down State laws that in its view went too far in
favoring the short-term economic needs of the present
generation over conservation of the underlying natural resource
for current and future Pennsylvanians.
Additionally,
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation turns on the
majority’s decision to invoke and apply technical aspects of
private trust law.
We are doubtful about the propriety of applying technical
aspects of private trust law to a constitutionally-expressed
environmental public trust right and recommend that the
drafting and legislative history accompanying the adoption of an
environmental right in New York should indicate that it is

57. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust,
supra note 52, at 514.
58. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 960-63 (Pa. 2013); see
also Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (June 20, 2017).
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grounded in the traditional public trust doctrine.59
Summary and conclusions
The more specific and detailed the constitutional right, the
more readily we can rely upon strong and consistent judicial
intervention in its defense without much risk of judicial
aggrandizement.60 The Forever Wild provision in the New York
State Constitution presently functions in this fashion, with
courts regularly enforcing its clear constitutional command.61
However, the defining environmental problems and goals of our
generation and the next—including most notably climate change
and sustainability—are so wide-ranging and complex in their
causes, manifestation, and needed policy response (most of
which are difficulty to anticipate) that that they cannot be
captured in a neatly defined constitutional command the
enforcement of which obviates the need for judicial
interpretation and (possibly) more engaged judicial
involvement.
These issues are nonetheless of central—
constitutional—import.
Scholars identify a number of potential benefits of
constitutionalizing public rights. Because constitutional rights
“trump inconsistent statutes and regulations” they “create a
legal bulwark against incursion by the legislative or executive
From a federalism perspective, some have
branches.”62

59. Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 943 (June
20, 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Environmental Rights
Amendment should be interpreted using the principles of the public trust
doctrine as opposed to “precepts of private trust law”).
60. Usman, supra note 16, at 1516-17 (describing such provisions as
“highly specific detailed affirmative rights provisions” and noting that
“[r]igorous [judicial] enforcement of highly specific affirmative rights
provisions is warranted.”).
61. As stated supra, we do not recommend tinkering with the language
of Article XIV. In light of the large body of case law interpreting the Forever
Wild provision (and the extent to which it is indexed to the precise language of
that provision), the great benefit it provides, and the potential for efforts to
weaken to same (or simply cause inadvertent diminution), should a
Constitutional Convention occur, we would recommend that delegates not
touch or amend Article XIV in any respect.
62. John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public
Trust, supra note 52, at 471-72.
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theorized that “the identification and enforcement of state
constitutional rights can serve as a mechanism by which state
governments can resist and, to a degree, counteract abusive
exercises of national power.”63 Constitutionalized public rights
are also more permanent because it is harder to amend a
constitution than to alter statutes or regulations.64 And some
posit that “because of their enduring nature and their higher
legal status, public rights of the kind embodied in a bill of rights
tend to more easily become part of the broader public discourse
and public values over the long term than provisions in statutes
or regulations,” thereby “foster[ing] the values they embody.”65
While conceding that a robust, self-executing environmental
right (and/or trust duty) carries with it the possibility of an
expansion of judicial authority, experience gleaned from three
other States and New York’s application of other affirmative
constitutional rights suggests that there is little risk, in
particular in New York, that this will unduly displace legislative
prerogative. In the words of one scholar, “courts have seldom
invoked substantive environmental provisions to constrain or
dictate state policy except in ‘transition periods,’ when some or
all of the political branches of state government have lagged
behind public opinion on an important issue.”66 And even where,
as in Hawai’i, courts have interpreted constitutional
environmental rights and duties in a more expansive fashion,
the result has been judicial insistence upon consideration of and
respect for core, constitutional environmental values, such as a
recognition of the interests of future generations.
(2) Orientation and wording of a constitutional
environmental right
There is great variation in the wording of constitutional

63. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to
National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO.
L. J. 1003, 1004 (2003).
64. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust,
supra note 52, at 471-72.
65. Id.
66. Thompson, Environmental Policy and State Constitutions, supra note
15, at 865.
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environmental rights provisions, with constitutional texts
ranging from relatively bare assertions of a right to a healthy
environment to detailed descriptions of the content of the
environmental right.67 Having reviewed many articulations of
constitutional environmental rights, examined how they have
functioned (in particular in state constitutions), and considered
the specific needs of New York, the Task Force believes that the
constitutional text that establishes a constitutional right to a
healthy environment should explain that a healthy environment
requires the conservation and protection of our natural
resources, clarify that natural resources necessary to a healthy
environment belong to the people in common, and make clear
that the State has the duty to protect these natural resources.
The constitutional text should provide guidance for
understanding the meaning of the right to a healthy
environment by (a) describing it with reference to ecosystems
and the services that they provide; (b) making clear that the
right is held by and associated duties owed to future generations;
and (c) explaining that the natural resources that support a
healthy environment constitute a public trust. It should also
clarify the government’s duty to conserve and protect the public
natural resources held in trust for the public and provide a
mechanism for New Yorkers (citizens, through application to the
judiciary) to require that the government meet its duty.
Specifically, the Task Force recommends that a
constitutional environmental right for New York should:
• define the right to a healthy environment to include inter
alia resilient and diverse ecosystems;
• clarify that the public natural resources of New York

67. E.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art.
413 (“The State shall promote energy efficiency, the development and use of
environmentally clean and healthy practices and technologies, as well as
diversified and low-impact renewable sources of energy that do not jeopardize
food sovereignty, the ecological balance of the ecosystems or the right to
water.”); art. 414 (“The State shall adopt adequate and cross-cutting measures
for the mitigation of climate change, by limiting greenhouse gas emissions,
deforestation, and air pollution; it shall take measures for the conservation of
the forests and vegetation; and it shall protect the population at risk.”),
available
from
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html.
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furnish the fundaments of a healthy environment and are
held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people,
including future generations;
• assert the State’s duty to conserve and protect New York’s
public natural resources to safeguard the people’s right
to a healthy environment; and
• provide for any person to enforce the right against the
State and its subdivisions through appropriate legal
proceedings.
Together, these principles, which are explained in further
detail below, can be used to develop a constitutional
environmental right that provides meaningful protection to
citizens and direction to courts and legislators as New York
navigates modern environmental challenges.
A right
incorporating these principles would invite a judicial oversight
role and provide the judiciary with sufficient guidance to enable
courts to meaningfully engage while defining and limiting the
scope of judicial involvement so as to prevent undue
encroachment on the legislature’s policymaking role.
Ecosystem frame
Our recommendation to index a healthy environment to
resilient and diverse ecosystems reflects a recognition of our
embeddedness in and reliance on and impact upon natural
systems. This recognition will be important as we seek to
achieve sustainability and prepare for and navigate the impacts
of climate change. It also reflects an understanding of the
relationship between nature and man that accommodates both
anthropocentric values (the services that ecosystems provide
that advance human well-being) and inherent existence values,
including the value of diverse species.
Since the 1970s “growth vs. conservation” has been a
recurring dilemma. The goal should be to balance the market’s
appetite for “resources” within appropriate parameters. We can
see that the law we have developed is not preventing the
disintegration of many ecosystems. Climate change and lowlevel chemical exposures are two examples.
There is a
disjunction between our legal expectations and ecological
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reality. The fate of our essential ecological infrastructure is
uncertain and the legal response not yet adequate.68
Meanwhile, ecology and its constituent sciences and tools
are developing rapidly. One suggestion for the law that has
emerged from ecological studies is that we supplement use of the
term “environmental” with the more concrete term(s),
“ecological” or “ecosystem.” While the “environment” is abstract,
ecosystems are physical, local, and temporal. An ecosystem can
be mapped and studied. Ecological terminology, frameworks
and principles can assist the legal system in protecting the
actual environment.69
Professionals in ecology and related disciplines are
considering how best to manage and preserve ecosystems so that
their functional integrity is supported and maintained. The
literature on ecosystem services, ecological integrity and
sustainability presents new possibilities and reveals the sources
of risks we are recognizing now. An important step to
addressing these risks should be to acknowledge (or strengthen)
the connection between ecosystems and those who live in them,
to recognize a grounded legal basis for the inhabitants of
ecosystems to participate in its protection.
Public trust
We recommend indexing the constitutional right to a
healthy environment to a government trust obligation. The
concept of environmental public trust is historical and familiar,
but also dynamic and flexible.70 In New York, the common law
68. Johan Rockström & Mattias Klum, BIG WORLD, SMALL PLANET:
ABUNDANCE WITHIN PLANETARY BOUNDARIES 64-77 (2015) (identifying key
planetary boundaries).
69. The term “ecosystem” refers to the manner or process of how nature
constitutes itself, creating the infrastructure we rely upon. The Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystem services broadly as “the benefits
people obtain from ecosystems. These include provisioning services such as
food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods,
disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational,
aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil
formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling.” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ASSESSMENT 49, 54-55 (2003).
70. See Mary Christina Wood, NATURE’S TRUST – ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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public trust doctrine protects uses of navigable waters and has
been extended to safeguard municipal and State parks from
being alienated or converted to nonpublic use, to preserve
forests, and to protect historic sites.71 The concept of treating
environmental resources as a public trust is likewise reflected in
New York statutes.72 Grounding a constitutional environmental
right in traditional public trust concepts thus provides a
grounding for judicial interpretation. We fear that judicial
reluctance to elaborate on a bare assertion of a right to a healthy
environment would result in such a provision laying fallow.
Public trust principles can, moreover, guide government
response to emerging environmental challenges, like climate
change, that require grappling with aggregated harms, future
impacts and questions about long term sustainability. The
public trust doctrine articulates the existence of some outer
limits on private use of natural resources and it reaffirms the
democratic goal of broad access to meet the people’s common and
long term needs and opportunities.
One concern expressed about the creation of a constitutional
environmental right is its potential to impact private property
rights. We would recommend making an environmental right
self-executing only as against the State with respect to
satisfaction of its public trust duty. As such, it could not be
relied upon to bring suit directly against the owner of private
property. Of course, it is possible that in fulfilling its public trust
duty to conserve and protect public natural resources to protect
the constitutional environmental right the government may
adopt laws and regulations that restrict private activity. It is
FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE

(Cambridge 2014).
71. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of N.Y., 95 N.Y.2d 623 (2001)
(stating that “our courts have time and again reaffirmed the principle that
parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before
it can be alienated. . .for non-park purposes.”); Town of North Elba v.
Grimditch, 98 A.D.2d 183, 188 (3d Dep’t 2012).
72. See N.Y. Parks Rec. & Hist Preserve Law § 3.0l (protecting State
owned parkland throughout the State); N.Y. Parks Rec & Hist Preserve Law
§ 19.05 (safeguarding historic sites as parks to be protected); N.Y. Envtl.
Conservation Law, §15-1601 (McKinney 2011) (declaring that “all the waters
of the state are valuable public natural resources held in public trust. . .and
this state has a duty as trustee to manage its waters effectively for the use and
enjoyment of present and future residents and for the protection of the
environment.”).
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important to note, however, that these actions can just as well
be expected to enhance private property rights by promoting
environmental conditions that improve the enjoyment and value
of property.
Concerns might be raised that constitutional affirmation
that public natural resources are held as a public trust might
prevent private property owners from obtaining just
compensation through a regulatory takings claim. A vested
property right is a precondition for a regulatory takings claim
and for purposes of the Takings Clause, property is defined with
respect to “the restrictions that background principles of the
[s]tate’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.”73 Thus, a property owner cannot obtain just
compensation where background principles of state property or
nuisance law (including, possibly, the public trust doctrine)
already limit the scope of the property right in the manner of the
challenged regulation.74 Notably, “[g]overnment defendants
have successfully raised the public trust doctrine as a defense in
a number of takings cases across the country, particularly those
involving submerged lands,” although whether and under what
circumstances the public trust doctrine qualifies as a
background principle that will defeat a takings claim remains
unsettled.75
We think it unlikely that constitutional assertion that
public natural resources constitute a public trust will
significantly impact private property owners’ opportunities to
obtain just compensation. It is unclear whether a constitutional
assertion of public trust would be deemed a relevant background
principle. Moreover, in many cases, the public trust will overlap
with other recognized background principles that limit the use
of property, such as the exercise of police powers or the
prerogative to intervene to prevent private property from being
used in a manner that unreasonably interferes with the rights
of others, which already forestall takings claims. And, as
recently reiterated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Murr v.
Wisconsin, whether a regulatory taking has occurred typically
73. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
74. Id.
75. John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine As A Background
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 934 (2012).
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depends upon the particular facts.76 We thus do not believe that
there is significant risk that articulation of a constitutional
public trust and associated duty relating to public natural
resources would unduly affect the rights of private property
owners.
Enforcement
To be effective, the environmental right should be selfexecuting by providing for any person to enforce the right
against the State and its subdivisions through appropriate legal
proceedings. As discussed at length above, absent such an
enforcement mechanism, the right may lay fallow and provide
little value. Additionally, allowing for citizen enforcement
should not occasion undue judicial aggrandizement. One
important question raised, however, in structuring a provision
to allow for enforcement of the right by citizens against the State
is which entities are subject to the duties and responsibilities
created by the right and subject to suit. In short, how should the
State and its subdivisions be defined and understood?77
It would be inadequate to limit suits to actions directly
against the New York State Legislature. Actions and decisions
with significant impacts on the State’s environment and natural
resources are commonly undertaken by a multitude of
government actors. Having looked to New York statutes which
address obligations of government for guidance,78 the Task Force
76. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, (“A central dynamic of the Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence, then, is its flexibility. . . . In adjudicating
regulatory takings cases a proper balancing of these principles requires a
careful inquiry informed by the specifics of the case.”).
77. Other states’ environmental right provisions vary as to who is covered
and who can initiate enforcement. In Pennsylvania, for example, the
constitutional text places the duty on the “Commonwealth,” which courts have
interpreted to include “all levels of government in the Commonwealth.”
Franklin Twp. v. Com., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 500 Pa. 1, 8–9, 452 A.2d 718, 722
(1982). In Hawai’i, public natural resources are held in trust by “the State,”
the “State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawai’i’s
natural beauty and all natural resources,” and the right to a clean and
healthful environment is enforceable by “[a]ny person . . . against any party,
public or private. . .” HRS Const. Art. XI, §§ 1, 9.
78. Specifically, the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)
the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) as well as the State Administrative
Procedures Act (SAPA) and some provisions of the criminal laws all in some
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recommends that the right extend to and be enforceable against
the sovereign State of New York, defined as the State, its
counties, and chartered municipalities including with the
broadest interpretation possible all administrative and
legislative bodies, all municipal instrumentalities including
without limitation public authorities chartered by the State
together with individuals, boards, cooperatives or organization
empowered with any authority through the sovereign power of
the State.
Conclusion
For the reasons described above, the Task Force
recommends that (I) no changes be made to Article XIV; and (II)
Article I be amended to set forth an environmental right. Article
XIV provides a great value to the citizens of New York and
should be maintained in its integrity. Article XIV is not,
however, adequate in scope to meet today’s pressing and
unprecedented environmental challenges.
Indeed, the
ecosystems within the Forest Preserve cannot be protected in
the long term without decisive action to respond to climate
change.
We also, therefore, recommend that the New York State
Constitution clearly articulate and provide a means for citizens
to insist upon respect for core environmental principles through
the addition of an environmental right. In some respects, these
principles are so fundamental that they can understood to be a
condition of sovereignty, part of our social compact. All too often,
however, the continued existence of resilient ecosystems capable
of supporting and enriching life is assumed and the threats to
the same are invisible in their proliferation and diffusion. As we
confront existential questions of sustainability and the human
impact on life systems, there is value in stating a right
understood to exist—that New Yorkers have a right to an
environment capable of supporting and sustaining life—and
way mandate that government function in service to citizens. As such the
statutes were crafted to encompass various subsets of government actors.
None of the statutes is specifically broad or focused enough to provide language
that can be co-opted in whole for use in an environmental right but the
statutes’ definitions are instructive.

http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10

32

TASK FORCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

214

PACE LAW REVIEW

10/23/17 10:12 PM

Vol. 38:1

providing a means for citizens and the judiciary to protect it.
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